Explainer: Iran's Relationship with Latin America

Iran has embassies in 11 Latin American countries, many of which were opened during a 2007 diplomatic push, shepherded by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013). Iran’s military has performed naval tours of the region, including a 2023 voyage that saw Iranian warships dock in Brazil and travel through the Panama Canal. The Iranian government also runs a Spanish-language media company, HispanTV, which has produced content for broadcast and social media since 2011.

Though not a major economic player, Iran maintains trade ties with most of Latin America, with Brazil representing the biggest regional trade partner. The Brazilian government reported the trade as totaling $3 billion in 2024, a 31 percent increase from the year before. The exchange is mostly Brazilian exports of agricultural products to Iran. Iran mainly exports fertilizer to Brazil. In 2023, Iran joined BRICS, the bloc of which Brazil was one of the founding members.  Brazil will host a BRICS summit in July, which Berg said could be a flashpoint for the country’s bilateral relationship. “Is BRICS going to be overtaken by the Iran issue?” asked Berg. “What do the BRICS and Brazil do? How does Lula conduct himself with Iran at the BRICS?”

Although Iran is a major oil exporter, 90 percent of its product goes to China, meaning it is not a significant energy exporter to Latin America. Still, Iran has been a partner to Venezuela in evading U.S. sanctions on its oil to get it to market. And uncertainty around the conflict has caused global crude prices to rise and fall. 

Latin America, a region with no nuclear warheads, has a history of promoting nuclear non-proliferation. In the past, leaders such as Lula have pushed for agreements with Iran to control its atomic activity.

Tehran’s ties in the region are not static. Several relationships have ebbed depending on the parties in power. Some countries, like Ecuador and Paraguay, grew closer to Iran under prior governments, but have since distanced themselves from the regime.

Perhaps the strongest and most persistent relationship in the region is between Caracas and Tehran. Jumpstarted by a series of state visits by Chávez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) between 2005 and 2007, the two countries have expanded their trade and security cooperation with annual bilateral summits. “What brought the Iranians to Chávez in the first place was Ahmadinejad’s attempt to get some legitimacy and look for a way to push back against the United States,” explained Fonseca. The relationship has endured beyond both leaders’ tenures. In 2022, Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela’s current leader, offered Iranian officials asylum if they are forced to flee their country.

Iranian sources valued trade with Venezuela at $3 billion in 2023. In June, Iran reported that it was in the process of finalizing a bilateral trade deal.

A cornerstone of the economic relationship, though, has been Iran’s aid in helping the Maduro regime evade sanctions. The U.S. government strengthened sanctions on the Andean country after its 2019 presidential election, and Iran was one of several countries to accept Venezuelan crude oil shipments in return for cheap gasoline and financial assistance. Cooperation between the countries’ oil sectors continued. In 2021, Iran and Venezuela agreed to a swap of oil products with the goal of improving the quality of Venezuelan crude. In 2022, Tehran helped repair a Venezuelan oil refinery. 

In exchange for its help on the oil sector, the Maduro regime has struck deals to build and sell Iranian cars and to allow Iran to lease farmland in Venezuela, according to CSIS. The Maduro regime has also purchased oil from Iran by paying in gold. 

Iran and Venezuela have also cooperated on security matters. For example, Iran maintains a drone manufacturing facility on a Venezuelan air base where it also trains personnel to operate the equipment. It is believed that Iran sells weapons systems to Venezuela. In 2009, Iran and Venezuela were collaborating on efforts to find uranium in the South American country. At the time, Chavez said he believed Iran has the right to have a nuclear program.

After Israel fired missiles at Iran, Maduro voiced his support for Tehran and called on the Global South to do the same. Still, Douglas Farah, president of IBI Consultants, said this reaction was likely disappointing to Iran. “They were probably hoping for something a little more outspoken or threatening then they ended up getting.” Berg wrote in a recent piece that China and Russia’s reaction to Iran being attacked was also muted, which could send a message to their Latin American allies about their limits of their support.

In recent years, Iranian officials have signed agreements with Bolivia, Cuba, and Nicaragua. These relationships are, in part, “a product of those countries looking to build global alliances,” explained Fonseca. All three, he said, are isolated from the United States.

Bolivia and Iran signed an accord in 2023 where the South American nation will receive reconnaissance drones and river boats. There was also agreed upon cooperation between the countries on cybersecurity and military training. It is not credibly known if any of the agreement has been actualized.

Bolivia has purchased military aircraft parts since 2010. Farah spotlighted the Iran-Bolivia relationship as one to watch. “They are there in a much more significant way than we generally talk about,” Farah said. Cuba also signed recent accords. The two sanctioned nations seek to expand their port use agreements and cybersecurity agreements. In the past, Tehran has provided credit lines to Cuba. 

While Nicaragua has not signed any recent agreements with Iran, its top officials have met to discuss military cooperation. Fonseca noted that in the past there have been questions about the large number of Iranian diplomats stationed in Managua.

None of these three countries recognize Israel; Nicaragua severed ties in 2024, Bolivia in 2023, and Cuba in 1973.

Hezbollah, a Lebanese political party and paramilitary group backed by Iran, is believed to have been behind the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires that left 85 dead. Several Latin American governments—including Argentina, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, and Paraguay—designate Hezbollah a terrorist group.

Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war in 2023, Latin American intelligence agencies have thwarted several terrorism plots allegedly linked to Hezbollah, including a 2023 plan in Brazil to attack a Jewish community center. “Latin America presents soft targets for Iran to strike back against Jewish and Israeli interests, explained Berg. “Iran doesn’t make a distinction between what is Jewish and what is Israeli.”

The Milei government has redoubled efforts to raise awareness of Hezbollah's activities in the region. In June, his security minister, Patricia Bullrich, said that Hezbollah has a presence in Bolivia, Chile, and the tri-border area between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. Milei has vowed to renew the investigation into the AMIA bombing. To this day, no one has been convicted for the terrorist attack, though in 2024, Bullrich said the government had identified the man they believe masterminded the bombing.

The governments of Israel and the United States have both spotlighted Venezuela’s relationship with Iran as contributing to Hezbollah’s presence in the region. Venezuelan Vice President Tareck El Aissami is believed to be an intermediary between the Maduro regime and Hezbollah, laundering money for the group and organizing joint training sessions. El Aissami has been accused of issuing visas to Hezbollah members.

What might Hezbollah’s presence in the region mean for this iteration of the conflict? “Iran has a history of attacking in an asymmetrical manner. [It has] a history of reacting outside of the country,” said Farah. If Hezbollah has the capacity for an attack, he said, Latin America could be a priority location.