The Mexico Challenge

Over a period of 30 days beginning in March this year, no less than three senior U.S. cabinet level officials traveled separately to Mexico City for consultations with their Mexican counterparts. This followed a pre-inaugural meeting between President Obama and Mexican President Felipe CalderoŒn in Washington in the middle of January, Congressional hearings which raised Mexico issues with new urgency in late winter, and a Sense of the Senate resolution that calls on the United States to do everything it can to assist Mexico’s efforts against drugs, illegal weapons, and the cartels. It all culminates with Obama’s own visit Thursday and Friday.

Why this burst of activity?  After all, the same issues have been present for many years, and nobody who followed the presidential campaign would have had reason to believe that the incoming Obama Administration would view Mexico issues as particularly pressing.  Yet, in the first 100 days of the administration, Mexico has clearly become a top foreign policy concern.  Several things have contributed.  The first is the stark reality on the ground in Mexico itself.  When Calderon first came to power in 2006, he promised that one of his first steps would be to retake Mexico from the cartels and to rid the nation of the parallel society run by the illegal narcotics traffickers.  Though many scoffed at the time, the president remained focused on doing exactly what he said he would.  As a result, violence in Mexico has spiked.  Not only has the government crackdown begun to impact the cartels, which are fighting back viciously, but the cartels have also begun to fight among each other for control of the lucrative routes into the United States.

Previously, most of the parties had a de facto agreement that, so long as they minded their own business, the others would, as well.  But now that arrangement has ended. Much of the violence has been shocking, with stories of beheadings, acid baths, and the brazen defiance of hired thugs -- many of them former members of Mexico's military elite force Los Zetas --leading the news on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border. As the security situation has deteriorated, and the news keeps coming, it has become abundantly clear that something must be done.

At the same time, much like Colombia in the 1990’s, talk in the United States has turned to the possibility that Mexico may in fact become a so-called “failed state,” which the central government does not control and which serves as a primordial soup for the development and export of security threats.  U.S. government intelligence analysis has suggested the comparison, putting Mexico in the same category as Pakistan, and warned that dramatic steps need to be taken now in order to prevent such a scenario from occurring.  Of course, for numerous reasons such a comparison is absurd, yet it would be inconceivable to allow a “failed state” on the southern border of the United States.  The mere mention of such a possibility—in addition to reports that Mexican cartels have organized in numerous cities in the United States where violence has spilled over—has been enough to mobilize both governments and the U.S. Congress to support a broader program of bilateral security.

Strategic hemispheric realignment may have also, ironically, played a role in raising the Mexico profile in Washington.  While Washington slept in a post-9/11 security-induced coma, Brazil emerged as a new global heavyweight, a reality confirmed by President Obama’s March 14 meeting at the White House with President Lula.  All the attention paid to Brazil, however, over trade policy, energy, agriculture, and the financial crisis, has caused Mexico to take steps to reconfirm its special relationship with the United States as a bridge between Washington and the rest of Latin America, and has led the White House to reciprocate.  It’s a delicate dance, to be sure, and one that has yet to play out fully.

Will the US-Mexico relationship change fundamentally?  Most likely, not so much, because the relationship was already broad and diverse, if relegated to the inside pages of newspapers.  Nonetheless, the credibility of the new U.S. Administration is now on the line, politically, financially, and strategically, and efforts will be intensified to reduce violence by rooting out the cartels, restricting the trade in weapons from north to south, and cooperating with greater urgency in law enforcement actions.  The calculus is simple: if we can’t get it right with Mexico, our closest Latin neighbor both literally and figuratively, we’ll have trouble with the rest of our hemispheric agenda.

It’s a sobering thought, and one with which official Washington is only beginning to come fully to grips.  Initial steps are promising, but efforts must be sustained.  If they are, the bilateral relationship with Mexico will finally be elevated to the higher strategic position it has long deserved.