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Every four years the policy community is abuzz with ideas and efforts to define the most pressing issues for the next U.S. president and administration. Discussions of new paradigms, new approaches, and new realities become the currency of the policy world. From the economy, to healthcare, to energy, to the Middle East, every policy entrepreneur worth his or her salt has put together position papers for the campaigns, transition teams, and those perceived to be close to the candidates.

This ritual also plays out in hemispheric policy. Already we are being inundated with proposals that, at bottom, boil down to the following common denominator: the United States must pay more attention to Latin America, the Caribbean, and Canada. From the left, right, or center, the perception of U.S. disengagement in the region since 9/11 has rightly or wrongly been a point of broad consensus.

The presidential campaigns have also begun looking at these issues in a serious way. Both are recommending a number of new initiatives and new approaches for the hemisphere. Some of the ideas are standard and conventional, others are creative and clever. While it’s quite appropriate for the campaigns to discuss difficult issues such as trade expansion or immigration reform, for example, the ability of either candidate to implement such reforms will be circumscribed by numerous things, including the budgetary and political environments once actually in office.

Naming a White House Special Envoy for the Americas, however, would be virtually without cost, would be doable without difficulty, and would have a significant, immediate impact on U.S. relations in the Americas. In fact, that’s one of the top recommendations of the Obama campaign for improving hemispheric policy. It is a smart recommendation, and should be among the first steps that the new president takes as he builds his overall foreign policy agenda.

Granted, I have a unique bias: from 1995-98, I was the senior advisor in the White House Office of the Special Envoy for the Americas. In that regard, I saw firsthand the important and lasting work that was accomplished on behalf of the president and the American people in hemispheric affairs. The ability of then-Special Envoy Mack McLarty to serve as an advocate for Latin America and the Caribbean directly with the president, first lady, vice president, and national security advisor, among others, yielded impressive achievements by working within traditional policy channels but not being diminished by them, even when the administration was focused on resolving conflict in Kosovo and other matters, and even in an environment without fast-track trade negotiation authority.

Arguably, U.S. relations with the nations of the Americas reached a historical high point during that period, in part because the president and former Chief of Staff McLarty understood implicitly that U.S. relations in the hemisphere depend significantly on both tone and substance, including the pursuit of true partnership in both “dichos” and “hechos.” Words and body language matter, and, when representing the United States in the hemisphere, it is equally important to be able to listen as well as to speak.

After McLarty left the position in 1998, former Florida Gov. Buddy MacKay took the reins, continuing the work of the special envoy with charm, good grace, and effectiveness, working to advance the trade agenda while gaining critical support for Plan Colombia, among other important achievements.

Nonetheless, during the 2000 elections, the Bush campaign made clear its desire to do away with special envoys generally as a tool for diplomacy, shunning the roles of George Mitchell in Ireland, Jesse Jackson in Africa, McLarty and MacKay in the Americas, and others as well. The campaign suggested that once the “adults” were back in control, the traditional channels of diplomacy and foreign policy would be adequate for managing most issues.

This proved to be a mistake.

Latin America and the Caribbean are ripe for the appointment of a new special envoy. In the Americas, the need to appoint a personal representative of the president to engage in high-level, personal diplomacy is significant. Post-World War II and post-9/11 foreign policy practitioners have largely denigrated the importance of hemispheric affairs while focusing on matters of greater strategic importance. By refusing to be bound by the traditional channels, a special envoy with the ear of the president could bring needed senior level attention to matters that might otherwise get buried in the normal process. As well, regional leaders would know that when issues are truly important, they have a friend in court, an advocate who can serve to promote the enhanced relations that U.S. and a number of regional leaders seek. And a new president would find that the appointment of a special envoy at the beginning of his administration would provide a focal point, and a symbolic statement of engagement at the most senior levels, with the leaders and people of the Americas.

With a Summit of the Americas in April 2009 staring him in the face and the critical need to get off on the right foot in hemispheric policy, such a symbolic statement of a new beginning in hemispheric affairs would also be a practical necessity. Without the need for Senate confirmation, a special envoy could be in place on Day One of the new administration, well before the next assistant secretary of state for the Western Hemisphere, and would therefore be able to provide leadership on hemispheric matters in the critical period prior to the summit.

To be effective, a special envoy for the Americas must have the full confidence of the president, because the authority of the position flows directly from the personal relationship with the president. At the same time, the special envoy must also be able to work cooperatively with the bureaucracy. The relationship must be truly symbiotic. The bureaucracy has the resources to manage issues and provide critical expertise and support, while the special envoy must have the political firepower to be able to speak clearly and directly on behalf of the president—and clearly and directly to the president. The special envoy must also be able to speak in the region as well as to domestic U.S. audiences including Congress. And he or she must be able to gain the respect of the foreign policy establishment, which will otherwise attempt to undermine his or her efforts in the age-old Washington battle for influence and turf. McLarty and MacKay managed the position with aplomb; former Florida Gov. Jeb Bush could also have been effective as a special envoy had he pursued it after leaving the mansion in Tallahassee.

Of course, the appointment of a special envoy for the Americas will not magically transform U.S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. Nor will it fundamentally change the traditional bias of U.S. foreign policy toward non-hemispheric issues, or change the overall environment within which hemispheric policy must be made and carried out. But it will show the region that it is not forgotten, and that the people of the United States remain fully engaged.

The obvious question is who would fill such a role, which depends on who is eventually elected and how the new foreign policy team shapes up. Nonetheless, someone with a profile like New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson would appear to make sense for the Democrats; current Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez would likely fit well on the Republican side, to the extent either were even interested.

But the larger point remains: the next president will want to establish a tone of respect and partnership with willing hemispheric leaders right from the beginning of his term. And the naming of a Special Envoy for the Americas would be one solid place to start.