What's Next for Cuba and the Western Hemisphere?

HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  MARCH 5, 2008   CHRISTOHER SABATINI SENIOR DIRECTOR, POLICY  AS/COA AND EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, AMERICAS QUARTERLY  
***As Prepared for Delivery*** 

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. It is a privilege to be with you to discuss the meaning of Fidel Castro’s stepping aside and its implications for Cuba and the Hemisphere. I represent the Americas Society and the Council of the Americas, two organizations created to promote democracy, open markets and the rule of law throughout the Americas.

Reading the Tobacco Leaves of Cuba’s Political Reshuffling

The last time I had the honor of testifying on Cuba was before the Committee in March 2003, after the crackdown on dissidents and the roundup and imprisonment of 75 democracy and human rights activists. In the five years since, despite the recent political reshuffling, sadly little has changed. 
The official resignation by Fidel Castro and the election of Raúl Castro as President and a cadre of old guard around him is a strong signal that nothing has changed or will in the near term. Speculation that Raúl could be a closet reformer who would begin to open the Cuban economy along the lines of China or Vietnam has been dashed by the leaders that Fidel’s younger brother brought with him to power and his continued deference to his older brother.

Many expected the beginning of a generational shift with the February 24th National Assembly elections. Instead, the average age of the new leadership is over 70 years old. This includes the elevation of José Ramón Machado Ventura to the first Vice President—a man who, as a medic, fought alongside Fidel and Raúl in the mountains of Cuba, and who has openly expressed his opposition to “perestroika.” The appointment passed over the number three, Carlos Lage, whom many thought represented a faction for change. In all, three generals were appointed to high positions in the government, indicating that, if anything, Raúl, who has served as defense minister since 1959, will rely on the armed forces as his base of support and his old allies within the armed forces.  This reliance on the military and Raúl’s strong roots within it is significant. In the first instance it will mean an expanded role for army officials in policymaking, over party ideologues or technocrats. It also has implications for the prospect of economic liberalization—Cuba’s “perestroika”—that many believed would occur under a Cuba led by Raúl Castro. In recent decades the military has assumed greater control over the economy.   Today the military-run holding companies La Gaesa and La Gaviota own everything from hotels to industry and account for three quarters of Cuba’s export earnings. Indeed, the military-controlled sectors of the Cuban economy are the most effectively managed and run—in an economy in which inefficiencies, corruption, bottlenecks, and low productivity are endemic. The concentration of economic assets in military hands has, in effect, bought the military’s loyalty to the leadership and its policies. Now, with the man who oversaw that expansion of the military’s economic role at the top of the national infrastructure, it is difficult to imagine that Raúl will pursue economic policies that could potentially hurt the military’s economic prerogatives.

Much has been made of Raul Castro’s more delegatory management style as opposed to his brother’s autocratic, micro managing, top-down method of imposing his personal will. We should not make too much of this difference in style, particularly in light of the recent elections. Managing the armed forces, particularly as they have expanded to economic sectors, demands a level of delegation. The question is to whom he delegates and the opportunities for the diversity of opinions to translate into real change. And here there is little indication that delegation and the processes of airing frustrations have produced real changes in decision-making and policies. The Cuba regime remains, from its genesis, a top-down structure, now controlled largely by a cadre of aging military officers with little structural, personal or historical incentive for change.

At a human rights level, little has also changed. Of the 75 arrested in the Black Spring crackdown of March 2003, 55 remain in prison—the 20 were released for medical reasons, close to the end of their sentence. Overall the total number of political prisoners has declined from 316 to 234, according to a source inside the island. However, much of this reflects a change of tactics by the government. In recent years, the regime has learned to rely more on short-term detentions, harassments, and beatings to intimidate the population rather than the more traditional arrests and long-term imprisonment used in 2003 that brought international condemnation. Observers have also made a note of the recent signing by the Foreign Minister, Felipe Pérez Roque, of two human rights accords. We should not make too much of this and remember that the Cuban government has signed or is a party to numerous human rights and labor rights treaties and agreements, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, numerous International Labor Organization covenants, and even signed the IberoAmerican Viña del Mar agreements that commits signatories to free and fair elections. Moreover, the government has already admitted that it will only adhere to the parts of the recently signed agreements that it considers relevant.

In the Context of the Hemisphere

Cuba’s lack of change in the foreseeable future only underscores the need for the U.S. to redouble its efforts to work with its hemispheric friends to open markets, consolidate democratic institutions, reach out to new, emerging leadership, and address concerns of economic and personal insecurity.
The lack of political change in Cuba is in many ways emblematic of the divisions within the hemisphere: on the one hand we have forward looking, responsible governments (of both the so-called right and left) that are pursuing economic growth, poverty alleviation and open markets through fiscal responsibility and deepening free trade agreements globally. On the other we have a set of governments that are pursuing a set of anachronistic economic policies of fiscal profligacy, top-down political patronage, and state-centric economic planning. In the former camp, we have the diverse governments of Michelle Bachelet of Chile, Felipe Calderón of Mexico, Álvaro Uribe of Colombia, Luiz Ignácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, Tony Saca of El Salvador, Leonel Fernández of the Dominican Republic, and Tabaré Vázquez of Uruguay. While much has been made of the so-called leftist shift in the hemisphere, the truth is that this group, in terms of economic and fiscal policies, has more in common despite the ideological labels that others have tried to apply to them. They embrace responsible economic and political policies.

In the other camp we have a group of outside leaders who have risen to power on popular frustration, anger against the previous ruling classes’ malfeasance and isolation, and the collapse of institutions that reflected patterns of social and racial exclusion.   Sadly, for many of these leaders Cuba remains a source of inspiration, despite the very obvious failings of the government and its repressive policies. While part of this is ideological affinity, there is also a material, pragmatic component to it. The Cuban government has been effective in delivering grassroots assistance programs to poor communities, in the form of medical care and education, and in promoting those programs to the local population as an example of Cuba’s solidarity with the underprivileged.

This division in the hemisphere, which I stress should not be seen as ideological or implacable, is unfortunate. U.S. policy should be oriented towards assisting those forward-looking governments that are willing to embrace the modern global economy, including open markets, responsible policies of poverty alleviation and social assistance, and democratic political inclusion.

Unfortunately, at this critical time, U.S. assistance in the region has declined, and consensus over the policy agenda has splintered precisely when it is most necessary to strengthen our allies. There are five areas in which the U.S. should be seeking to strengthen and expand the groups of modern leaders.
First, the U.S. needs to expand its economic assistance to the region, through programs such as the initiative sponsored by Chairman Engel and Congressman Burton in the House of Representatives (H.R. 3692). Development assistance to the region has declined in recent years as a percentage of U.S. development assistance globally. This is unfortunate, particularly as we seek to create economic opportunities through the opening of markets in the hemisphere. Much like the sponsored bill, economic and development assistance in the region must be tied to the goal of opening markets and trade. Ultimately, as research has demonstrated, the ability of countries to reap the benefits of free markets and address income gaps depends on two factors: infrastructure that gives excluded populations access to markets, and education. Assistance to provide those benefits to the broader population is an essential parallel component of our efforts to promote open markets, reduce poverty and create equitable, sustainable development.

Second, in this line, the U.S. needs to follow through on its commitments. In 1994 the heads of states and governments of the Americas convened in Miami in the first-ever Summit of the Americas and committed themselves to a free trade agreement of the Americas. While these initial ambitions have not been met, we must, as a nation, follow through and support those countries and leaders who have continued to negotiate in good faith with the U.S. for this goal. Doing so is essential to maintaining bipartisan consistency in our policy towards the Americas and deepening our relations with our friends in the hemisphere. To this end, the Council of the Americas strongly supports the approval of the Colombia and Panama free trade agreements.

Third, the U.S. should continue to engage in free trade negotiations with countries willing to embrace the global economy and open markets. This should not be exclusive of the supposed ideological persuasion of the government in power. We must seek to create an inclusive hemisphere that embraces a modern, integrated economy that can lift all people. In countries such as Ecuador and Bolivia a new leadership class is coming to its own, after centuries of exclusion.  If there is genuine, sustained interest on their part, the U.S. must demonstrate it is willing to listen and negotiate in good faith to help to promote their integration into the modern global economy and avoid a reversion to outmoded, autacratic development policies. In this regard, we applaud the Congress’ approval and the President’s signing the renewal of Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPDEA).

Fourth, as the price of oil continues to soar, the U.S. needs to work with its friends in the region to ensure access to energy sources and the development of new energy sources.

Fifth, the U.S. government needs to work with governments in the region to improve security. Today governments throughout the region are wrestling with the historical lack of a strong state that can effectively ensure democratic security for its citizens. This is a complex and long-term issue that has implications both for democracy in the region and for U.S. national security.

According to region-wide surveys, the number one or number two concern of Latin American citizens—depending on the country—is crime. That personal security has reached such a level of prominence in the minds of Latin Americans is no small feat in the most economically unequal region in the world. And perhaps not surprisingly, surveys indicate that those who feel most unsafe and threatened by crime are also those most willing to jettison human rights and democratic institutions in favor of more security.

The growth of narcotics trafficking and the attendant political and institutional corruption along with the strengthening of regional criminal networks such as the Central American maras transcend borders and effect our own citizens’ and national security.

For this reason, precisely, the U.S. needs to support the Merida Initiative with the Mexican government. The initiative represents an historic opportunity to collaborate on an issue of powerful importance to both Mexicans and Americans. According to a recent survey, 65 percent of Mexicans support the idea of receiving cooperation from the U.S. to address security concerns. As in so many issues—immigration and economic integration—among them, we are strongly tied by geography, shared national interest, and common goals to Mexico and its citizens on security.

Conclusion

In sum, with the Castro brothers in power, Cuba remains stuck in the past with little hope or opportunity for change emerging from a tightly controlled, geriatric inner circle. At the same time, though, much of the rest of the hemisphere is moving forward. In the face of the stasis within the Cuban government, the U.S. government can demonstrate its willingness to embrace and support those who do choose a path that looks to a modern, realistic future. This implies a greater effort to work with governments that are wrestling with the twin demands of Latin American citizens: economic and personal security. First, academic research and experience have taught us that open markets with a targeted development assistance program that seeks to address structural and resource-based inequality is the surest path towards growth and prosperity. Second, as citizens become increasingly concerned over crime and security, the U.S. must work with those elected governments that respond to citizens demands by addressing security and crime within a democratic framework.