



Argentina: Disinflation and recovery Juan Luis Bour, chief economist, FIEL


Council of Americas
New York, May 2nd, 2017


Inflation: high volatility during 2016





Acceleration in Q1 2017 followed by reversion in Q2












Additional payments (not pictured here) account for 0.8% of GDP



Wages: recovery in real terms since Q2 (lower inflation)


Inflation: summary

Inflation is on the path to converge to a monthly rate below or close to 1.3% for most of the rest of the year.


The average annual rate for 2017 will approach 24.7%, 13 percentage points below the average rate in 2016 (37.9%).

December rate (yoy) is expected to be 2-3 pp above the upper bound of Central Bank target (FIEL current estimate: 20%)


Inflation could pick up late in the year (after October) due to several factors, including tariff adjustments delayed in the first part of the year and an excess of monetary supply over demand (due to fiscal dominance and the strategy chosen to finance the deficit).




The real economy: a slow recovery




Agriculture: major jump in production since harvest 2016/17 Expect strong growth to remain in next years.



Public construction at full speed since 2nd Half 2016. Private works wake up in 2017: prices and real estate transactions go up



Formal employment lags: moving to self employment



Perspectives: FIEL projections for 2017

Variable	Unit	2016	2017*
GDP	% change	-2,3	2,4
Gross Investment	% change	-5,5	6,0
Private Consumption	% change	-1,4	2,7
Inflation	Average % ch	37,9	24,7
inflation	December % ch	ber % ch 37,7	20,0
Evaluate nata	\$/USD, Avge	-2,3 -5,5 -1,4 37,9	16,10
Exchange rate	\$/USD, December	16,10	16,80
LEBAC rate	December Avge	24,75	23,50

Note: * forecast

Sources: INDEC,C Bank, FIEL Macro Forecasts (FMF)



Regulation of public utilities: achievements, drawbacks and challenges

Santiago Urbiztondo

Council of the Americas, New York, May 2, 2017



Initial context for Cambiemos (Dec-2015)

Counter-reform during K-administrations (2003-15):

- tariff freezing,
- cost-plus spiking fiscal subsidies,
- cross-subsidies,
- regulatory discretion, institutional degradation,
- investment contraction,
- late quality deterioration,
- spiking marginal costs,
- systemic energy crisis, reversed energy trade balance, etc.

Overall task: Four dimensions of "normalization"


- reduce fiscal subsidies (higher tariffs)
- attract investment
- minimize distributive (& political) impact
- avoid inflationary shock



Initial context for Cambiemos (Dec-2015)

Real tariffs in 2015 (2001=100)

Source: based on sectorial information; retail deflactor





The strategy adopted

Immediately:

- Deal with emergency in electricity sector (small scale emergency power additions), and renewable energy auctions
- Significant tariff & regulated wholesale price hikes in all public utility sectors, with focalized social tariffs for the poor
- Start normalization of energy T&D concession contracts through RTI ("integral tariff reviews"), within 1 year
- Start process to end intervention of ENARGAS

August 2016:

- Supreme Court ruled against NG residential price-hikes, requiring Public Hearings
- Higher than expected inflation & recession pushed for slower pace of price hikes & subsidy reduction


Revised strategy:

 Conduct Public Hearings, top maximum bill increases (400%), slow down price adjustments



Despite procedural mistakes (sidestepping Public Hearings), energy prices & tariffs are evolving towards actual opportunity costs (perhaps even more)

NG upstream prices for residential users: Values sanctioned in Apr-2016, and announced evolución post-Supreme Court ruling in Aug-2016






Today, T&D NG tariffs after RTI surpassed Apr-2016 hikes

40% average increase in T&D margins pending in 12 months 100% average increase in upstream prices pending in 2.5 years

Metrogas: Residential tariffs, before taxes, in US\$/MMBTU






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Metrogas: Estimated Residential bills, before taxes, in US\$/month






300% tariff hike in 2016 allowed 14% total US\$ cost reduction, eliminating AySA's deficit

In 2016, labor force up 3%, real wages constant, higher costs associated with tradable inputs In 2017, AySA is receiving subsidies only for investment (with 27% yoy overall nominal fall)

AySA: Tariff income, subsidies, total income and total costs, 2001 & 2006-2016, in MM US\$

Source: Own elaboration based on AASA, ERAS & INDEC.






Impact on fiscal subsidies

Expectation / projection presented one year ago:

2016 (4-m): significant fall (50% in USD, 1.7 pp down, from 4.4% to 2.7% of GDP) 2016 projected: final drop probably less, still around 1.5% of GDP





Impact on fiscal subsidies


Reality / revised projections:

2016: less than 1% of GDP fall

2017 projected: no significant variation (higher tariffs OK, but also higher NG prices – imports and Plan Gas– & appreciated peso)

Subsidies to public utilities (in MM USD and as % of GDP), 1989-2017*

Source: Own elaboration based on SIGEP (1989-1995, MECON (1996-2003) and ASAP (2004-2017): Until 2003 it includes YPF, GE, AyEE, Hidronor, AA, FFAA, ELMA, ENTEL, ENCOTEL and OSN. Since 2004 it includes subsidies to public and private firms in the energy, transportation and W&S sectors. * Own estimation based on first quarter.






- Institutional reform: new ENARGAS directory with upstream NG –not T&D or overall regulation– background dominance
- Public Hearings seen as a non-substantial, formal, obstacle (ENRE's RTI discussing firms proposals, deciding on alternatives not debated)
- Deepening cross-subsidies (besides social tariff) through manipulation of cost measures (new electricity tariffs)
- Extension of Plan Gas (higher prices on additional production) only to non conventional NG in Neuquina basin (not general, discriminates by region and technology, without convergence plan & long-term market rule)
- No new contractual rules –to stop cost-plus subsidies– applying to firms other than T&D NG and electric utilities



Electricity tariffs after RTI: Deepening cross-subsidies (on top of social tariffs) through manipulation of cost measures, "designing" residential fixed distribution costs to induce rational use, in fact bypassing legal ban (new electricity tariffs)


Edenor: Estimated Residential Bills, before taxes, in US\$/month





Electricity tariffs after RTI: Deepening cross-subsidies (on top of social tariffs) through manipulation of cost measures, "designing" residential fixed distribution costs to induce rational use, in fact bypassing legal ban (new electricity tariffs)


Edenor: Fixed Residential Charges, in US\$/month, Dec-2015 - Feb-2017





Electricity tariffs after RTI: Deepening cross-subsidies (on top of social tariffs) through manipulation of cost measures, "designing" residential fixed distribution costs to induce rational use, in fact bypassing legal ban (new electricity tariffs)


Edenor: Changes in US\$ Residential Tariffs, Dec-2001 to Feb-2017, by consumption level (kWh/month)





This manipulation did not occur in the NG RTI closed two months later by ENARGAS

Metrogas: Fixed monthly charges, in US\$, 2015, 2016 and 2017





Challenges


- New rules for price adjustments in competitive markets (energy) not announced yet:
 - Upstream NG & wholesale energy prices still set by the government, under cost-plus principle, approaching current marginal costs, without announcing long-term rule
 - New investments require knowledge of the rules that will govern them in the future, and paced convergence to unique competitive prices would be both credible and efficient
- Need to clearly escape de facto cost-plus rule: raising tariffs without anchoring long-run costs will likely be excessive & deceiving
- More generally, current efforts to cope with inherited "K counter-reform" need to be inserted into a new master-plan of consistent structural public utilities reforms



Fiscal and External Challenges


Daniel Artana


May 2017




Large portfolio capital inflows in Q1 2017


TOTAL SOURCES	18,2	TOTAL USES	18,2
		Argentines' savings in foreign	
Foreign Direct Investment	0,7	currency	4,8
Capital inflows for government &		Accumulation of Reserves at	
private sector	18,5	the CB	11,5
Other	-1,1	Current account deficit	1,9
		o/w Tourism	2,7










•A gradual program to reduce the fiscal deficit














Note: Gross Financing Needs exclude Transitory Advances from the Central Bank. Non-transferable Notes amortize after 2020.











The short-term and medium-term outlook

Upside

- The international context is likely to be benign
- An additional reduction in the cost of capital
- The opportunities opened by the removal of distortions (e.g. multiple exchange rates, taxes on exports, unnecessary regulations)

Downside

- Gradual improvement in fiscal accounts delays positive effects on the economy
- High costs in US\$
- Increase in investment constrained by current account deficit